The proof layer behind every FoundryNet reading and prediction. This is the developer/architecture detail. The product pages stay focused on the outcome: knowing which machine fails next.
We enforce the distinction by construction. A cryptographic signature proves a payload's integrity: that it hasn't been altered. It does not prove the claim inside is correct or endorsed. FoundryNet never conflates the two: an attestation proves integrity, and the reliability object proves we don't overclaim.
Every tool result across the network carries okf-reliability-v1 metadata: a machine-readable statement of what the result is and isn't warranting.
Verified results can be cryptographically attested and sealed into a tamper-evident record. Only hashes leave your environment; the raw telemetry never does. The result is a tamper-evident audit trail: a record you can independently verify when a warranty claim, lease end-of-term, or usage-based-financing dispute arrives.
External attestation is off by default. On an edge deployment that means zero outbound traffic. Attestation buffers locally and seals only when an operator explicitly enables it. Machines normalize, predict, and fire automations locally regardless.
Forge runs on the plant floor as an AWS IoT Greengrass component. Native MQTT (Sparkplug B), Modbus TCP/RTU, and OPC UA ingestion run on-device, the only place that can reach a broker or PLC on the local network, while corpus and (optional) settlement talk to the cloud.